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ENERGY POLICY: WHAT IS REALLY AT ISSUE
Mention energy policy and you will be offered a host of suggestions
as to what such a policy should include: price decontrol, continued
price control; increased leasing of federal lands, decreased leasing of
federal lands; support for hard technologies, support for soft technol-
ogies; more stringent environmental regulations, more lenient environ-
mental regulations; increased excise taxes on fuels, no excise taxes on
fuels; break up the oil companies, don't break up the oil companies. It
goes on and on. Yet, one may wonder why there is such disagreement on
these various topics when there is little or no disagreement on the fact
that we do need an energy policy.
Perhaps the very reason for this stalemate over energy policy is
staring us right in the face. A closer look at these topics which
receive so much attention will show that these are really "sub-issues"
of the energy situation or, more accurately, policy options we might
exercise to change our energy situation. But options can only be truly
agreed upon when and if the real issues are first understood and agreed
upon. It is suggested herein that not only have the basic issues of our
energy situation been largely ignored, but also those which are addressed
receive attention individually rather than as a part of the composite of
related issues. Therefore, absent a common base of understanding, it
has been impossible to delineate a consistent set of policy options.
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This is not to discount basic differences in political or personal
philosophies. However, the "real issues" suggested in this paper can,
for the most part, be agreed upon regardless of varying philosophies.
To put it bluntly, energy policy is concerned with much more than
prices and the structure of industry. We would be lucky if it were that
simple. In the short term, these may appear to be the prime considera-
tions; but in the long term, energy policy, perhaps more than any other
national policy, will effect our lifestyles, standard of living, and
perhaps our view of the world.
This study suggests that the real issues of our energy situation
are more fundamental:
e Social equity, redistribution of income and wealth.
* The relationship between energy, the quantity and quality of
GNP, employment, and commodity inflation.
* The social value of reduced dependence on OPEC.
e At what point (price) domestic supply could fulfill domestic
demand.
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It may not be possible to determine the absolute answers to these
issues, but we must direct our attention much more seriously to them
before setting out at a frantic pace to formulate national energy policy.
To ignore these issues would be to Ignore the real crux of the situation.
Given these issues, we must then ask two questions. These are
crucial questions, the answers to which will markedly shape any energy
policy. They are:
* Is the natural process of the marketplace too slow or too
uncertain, especially during a transition period of say 30
years, to some "backstop technology" such as fusion, breeders,
or solar?
* What are "proper" (i.e., mutually consistent and supportive)
roles for the public and private sectors?
When these are resolved, as discussed further on, it will provide a
"model" on which we can build and implement policies in an organized and
reasoned method. Otherwise, we will continue to struggle over the merit
of certain "sub-issues" which will at best only temporarily numb the
pain of the disease.
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The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to set forth a realistic
view of our energy situation, define the true Issues, and clarify deci-
sions which need to be made. It is Inaccurate to refer to our energy
situation as our "energy problem." The word "problem" implies that
there is a solution or cure which, when applied, will eliminate that
problem. The energy situation is much broader and more complex than
that. What we-have in this country is an energy situation which is
perceived as "not good" (and, therefore, to many it is a "problem").
What we want to do is change our "energy situation."
To do this it is first necessary to have an accurate view of the
total energy situation. A clear view of the situation will then make it
possible to identify the major concerns or "issues" involved that need
to be addressed in order to change the situation. When the situation
and the issues are clarified, policies which provide the ground rules
for grappling with the Issues in order to change the situation can be
decided upon and implemented. This is the sequence this piece follows.
There is herein no attempt to define what specific policies should
be implemented to change our energy situation. What is presented here
is an overview of the energy situation, identification of the issues, a
summary of the role of technology (including new energy sources), and
the dimensions of the issues which will help mold the policies adopted.
This piece attempts to provide the background necessary for sound policy
decisions which will, in turn, change our energy situation.
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It is important to note that we are not here considering an energy
"problem" or an energy "crisis." The former implies that there is a
solution which would permit a return to conditions essentially as they
previously have been. The latter has short-term implications that lead
to invalid analogies (e.g., winning World War II). As we will outline
here, the energy situation in the future will forever be fundamentally
different from what it has been in the past. That is, not a problem
that has a solution, or a crisis through which we must pass; rather, it
is a brand-new, long-term situation in which we must learn to live, and
it raises issues which must be continually addressed. Coping with the
energy situation is more nearly analogous to achieving world peace than
it is to winning World War II. It is never really achieved, but rather
grows (albeit, falteringly) as a result of wrestling with issues through
the continual development of policy.
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, that revolution
and the societies it has impacted have been based largely on the premise
of growing quantities of energy at declining costs. That world simply
no longer exists. For reasons to be clarified later, the future holds
prospects for only limited quantities of energy at rising costs--just
the reverse of all of our experience. To describe an energy "problem"
would imply a solution, which would permit a return to the former. To
describe it as a "crisis" would imply that, through some massive effort,
we could reverse the trend. We hold these to be invalid views.
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What we have on our hands is a new situation. The "problem" is
that we have not seen it as such, and we continue to bog down in trying
to patch up old policies, forms, and structures. The call here is not
for a "solution," but rather for an understanding of and agreement on
the new situation so that the issues to be faced can be agreed upon,
permitting the development of policy which will enable us to exist in
our new situation and grapple creatively with the issues.
Therefore, the reader will not find here a recommendation for any
particular policy. Rather, we argue here for the adoption of a framework
in which policy can be built over the years, for surely a viable, authen-
tic energy policy must be as dynamic and organic as, say, foreign policy
(and, perhaps, at least for the rest of this century, second in importance
only thereto).
Where We Are Coming From
The energy situation which has so many calling for a national
energy policy did not evolve overnight. It is a logical outcome of
trends in the world energy market over the past half-century. It does
not reflect any sudden change in the relationship between man and his
natural environment--although the trends may be building pressures for
more substantial adjustments than in the past. The most fundamental and
rapid changes appear to have been political (in the true sense of this
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word)--representing basic changes in property rights and the incentives
affecting the various actors in the petroleum marketplace.
Quite simply, what has happened is that the power over oil has
shifted from home to abroad. Until the mid-1960s, domestic production
of oil and gas could have satisfied domestic demand. The reason we were
importing foreign oil long before domestic production declined was that
until the winter of 1973-74, foreign oil was substantially cheaper than
domestic oil. It made good economic sense (at least in the short run)--
for the companies and the consumers--to import cheaper oil.
What brought the "energy crisis" to a head was the declining domes-
tic production, which (in part) made possible the five-fold OPEC price
hike in 1973-74. Now, foreign oil is no longer cheaper than domestic
oil, but we must import it because domestic production cannot satisfy
domestic demand at current prices.
It is necessary to accept the authenticity, seriousness, and long-
term nature of our energy situation; otherwise, the urgency of the
situation will be undermined and treated inappropriately. A statement
of this energy situation is given below, in what is hoped to be a non-
judgmental and comprehensive way.
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COMMERICAL CONTEXT OF ENERGY IN THE U.S.
Due to our political/economic structure, geographic size, and
resource wealth, the U.S. has an "energy system" which is different from
that of nearly any other country in the world. Because of this, there
are several basic points to keep in mind when considering energy policy
for the U.S.
In the U.S., all dimensions of energy lie primarily in the private
sector, whereas in most other countries, the government is significantly
engaged in certain dimensions. As long as the situation was stable in
the U.S., and the public's perception was that their needs were served,
the energy sector had a low public profile, and the market mechanism was
not questioned. However, when disruptions in supply and/or price occur,
frustrating the consumer, then the public is likely to want to become
involved in the decision-making process In ways other than through the
marketplace. This is usually embodied in questions regarding industry
structure and/or profit. Regardless of the validity of this reasoning,
it is a very real, decisive force in a democratic society.
Along that same line, in the U.S., energy companies are almost
entirely domestic companies. In most other countries, foreign companies
play some role in providing and distributing energy to consumers. This
leads to the perception that we (the U.S.) can "solve the problem" since
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the firms are "ours." It also leads to tensions, even within the firms,
when perceived market goals appear to be different from perceived national
goals, especially in the short term.
Because of the size of the U.S., there exist very crucial regional
differences with regard to need and supply, e.g., consuming New England,
producing Gulf Coast, conservationist Rocky Mountains, and depressed
Appalachia. Within most other countries, regional difference vis-a-vis
energy are minimal. In looking into the "energy future," one cannot
discount the significance of this. For example, why should a Texan be
complacent about paying four times more for Texas natural gas than a New
York resident pays? And why should a Colorado resident allow his land
to be strip mined in order to provide fuel-hungry plants in Michigan
coal to burn? These regional Interests make it all the more necessary
to arrive at a national consensus about the energy situation and issues.
Otherwise, decisions made on regional bases may serve little towards
bettering the nation as a whole.
Another point is that we currently have no "energy policy." This
is not unique in that there is not U.S. policy in any sector where the
government is not itself a supplier or consumer. For example, we are
not surprised that there is no "clothing policy." There is a "Farm
Policy," but there the government Is a significant customer, through
parity and stockpiling. There are also defense and highway policies.
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In energy, however, the government is not the customer. This is signi-
ficant because for the first time we are contemplating creating a national
policy for a segment where the government is not a direct consumer.
Therefore, we have no precedent to follow. (The "man-on-the-moon"
analogy is totally invalid, since in that case the government was the
only customer; in the energy sector, It very simply is not, to any
significant degree.)
Finally there is in the U.S. no "energy industry" in the sense that
there is a steel industry or an automobile Industry. The various firms
making up the energy sector are widely divergent as to function, regu-
lation, perspectives, and interests. Producers, transmission companies,
drillers, process equipment contractors, utilities, and retailers often
have little in common. Therefore, a policy aimed at such diverse ele-
ments will have to take into account numerous considerations.
From this description of the "energy setting," one can further
define several distinct characteristics of energy in the U.S. which
display further the magnitude of concerns with which energy policy must
deal.
In a broad sense, supply always equals demand (i.e., over any
significant time period, absent price controls and rationing). But
this happens in the energy sector only through a complex interplay among
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various factors as represented In Figure 1. The energy sector is highly
capital-intensive at almost every point. Consider, for example, the
investment involved in production, pipelines, ships, refineries, utili-
ties. Even the consumption of energy is capital-intensive: boilers,
automobiles, home heating, and cooking. This is one of the reasons that
the short-term supply and demand functions are radically different from
the long-term functions.
Also, energy is unique in that it is only a means to an end, never
an end in itself. Ultimate demands are for private transportation, not
gasoline; for a heated home, not for gas or oil or electricity. The
consumer is usually not concerned over the type of fuel, as long as it
fulfills his needs and is economical. Therefore, there is constant
interfuel competition through a complex network. These interrelation-
ships are not only complex but also dynamic. Often the implications of
changing energy circumstances are not always obvious or understood
because of the complexity of the system as well as the slow response to
changing supply and changing prices caused by the capital intensity at
every point.
Rising Prices and the Supply Curve
Given thecomplexity and characteristics of this system, now con-
sider the impact of rising prices, which is one of the main concerns
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over our present energy situation. Figure 2 shows the supply curve. S
represents the short term. As price increases from P1 to P2 , the total
volume available to the market increases from V1 to V2. When this
occurs, marginally profitable supplies are attracted to the marketplace
and supply, therefore, increases. Suppliers of V1 continue to supply
this volume, but at the higher price, P2, and therefore at increased
profitability equal to V1 (P2-P1), or the shaded area. This is referred
to as "economic rent," and is a natural result of the operation of the
marketplace.
However, over the long term, historically, this has not occurred
because the supply curve has moved to the right (S2). This has happened
for two reasons. The first is improved technology and increased pro-
ductivity, such as better exploration techniques and improved production
processes. The second is that major discoveries were made of progres-
sively larger fields which were inherently cheaper to produce.
The effect of this moving of the supply curve continually to the
right is that, at constant price P, increased volume V3 becomes avail-
able to the market. Figure 3 illustrates that, in fact, from 1920 until
1973, oil prices were declining. During the same period, supplies
increased significantly. Thus, the "economic rent" described above did
not in fact exist in the long term and the U.S. became accustomed during
this period to ever declining energy costs, relative to other commodities.
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The sharp rise in this curve in 1973 was, of course, caused by the
OPEC price increase, but additional factors were simultaneously coming
into focus which accentuated the effect and made it seem to some that
the so-called "energy crisis" happened overnight.
Other Factors Which Affect the Supply Curve
Figure 4 adds another dimension to the curve shown in Figure 2. As
mentioned before, the supply curve has historically moved to the right
(S 1 to S2) as technology improved and new large, cheaply produced fields
were found. This is no longer the case. By the early 1970s, technol-
ogical progress had flattened out, most of our large fields had been
discovered in conventional exploration areas, and OPEC's oil jumped from
"cheap" to "expensive" from the U.S. perspective. New fields were
increasingly expensive--oil from the North Sea and Alaska's North Slope,
for example, is much more expensive to produce than oil from the U.S.
Gulf Coast.
Thus, the supply curve instead of moving over the long term from SI
to S2, began moving from S 1 to S 3. At a constant price, PI, the volume
available to the marketplace would decline from V to V3. Conversely,
for a constant volume V1 to be available, the price would have to in-
crease from Pi to P3, creating an economic rent represented by (P3-
Pl)(V3)
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Simultaneously, environmental concerns and awareness were becoming
significant, so that the very nature of "energy" acceptable to the
marketplace changed, at an increased cost for the same volume of energy.
This too is reflected by a movement of the supply curve from S 1 to S3.
Due to the increased cost associated with making it "clean, acceptable"
energy, the price necessary for a given volume, V1, of "old, dirty"
energy increased from P1i to P3. Or, at a given price P, a lower volume
V3, of clean energy is available than the volume of "dirty" energy, V1
than would have been.
Also, concerns and awareness over the depletability of natural
resources became significant. The fact is, there is just so much there;
and this also drives the supply function to the left. In the long term,
the leftward movement of this curve Is indeed a function of the volume
removed.
U.S. ENERGY SITUATION
In a situation where demand is increasing, it is deemed unacceptable
for the supply curve to move leftward. However, this is what is now
happening. A closer look at the U.S. energy market will further clarify
the factors which effect our supply and demand curves and, consequently,
our true energy situation.
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Several other factors, external and internal, have altered the
natural market process which, up until recently, supplied us with new,
cheaper, more efficient forms of energy and kept the supply curve moving
to the right. The history of primary energy sources in the U.S. is
reflected in Figure 5. The replacement of wood with coal and of coal
with oil occurred "naturally." That is, in the marketplace, each estab-
lished source was replaced by a new, cheaper source. For the first time
in our history the marketplace is not providing us a cheaper replacement
fuel for oil and gas. Because new domestic oil sources are more expen-
sive to produce and because new energy sources, such as oil from shale,
oil and gas from coal and solar energy, are more expensive than OPEC oil
(which is our marginal supply), we now find ourselves in a situation
where if OPEC is to be displaced from U.S. supply, it must be displaced
not by a cheaper source, but by a more expensive source. That is to
say, for the first time in history, marginal costs exceed average costs.
We simply have no experience at dealing with this kind of phenomenon.
(There is also significant concern over the 50-60 year time period
Figure 5 illustrates required to replace one energy source with another
through the "natural" process.)
The implications of this can be further seen in Figure 6 which
portrays the present U.S. market situation, and, in the most basic
sense, outlines our energy situation.
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When OPEC oil was cheaper than U.S. oil, t was imported (as limited
by Federal quotas), but U.S. prices were determined largely by the U.S
supply/demand curves. After 1973, OPEC was the highest priced oil
available and set the world price.
Let us assume that U.S. energy prices tend to follow world prices.
Even now, world prices exert an upward pressure on the price of control-
led "new" U.S. production. Then P is the world price, and V 1 is the
volume available from U.S. supply. However, V2 is the volume demanded
at that price, so V2-V 1 is the volume imported at that price. Theke 6
conidetabte concemrn oven the magnitude o thi6 volume, and the concern
i6 magniied by futute expectations: In the tong teAm, the U.S. upp y
cwrve wiE move ftom S I to S2, white the U.S. demand cwuve may welt move
6rom 1)i to 2 becau6e of inclea6ed population, incxea6ed GNP, and/or
inceased 4tandard of living. The g raoing dtctance between the suppty
and demand cue6 (itled by importl at poas6ibly xiuing pice6) i6 the
teal cAux o06 ou eneAgy stuation.
As can be seen, even if OPEC increases its price from P1 to P2,
imports could grow significantly to 12. (It is interesting to note that
U.S. volumetric dependency on OPEC would become even higher (V6-V5) if
OPEC did not increase prices to P2.)
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There are several other factors which have influenced the U.S.
supply and demand curves which are not apparent on Figure 6 and should
be noted. When OPEC oil was cheaper than U.S. production, the U.S. had
higher national energy costs than the other consuming countries. However,
the other countries applied high taxes to imported oil, especially
gasoline, so that the consumer saw higher prices than in the U.S.
Since 1973, the U.S. has not been the most expensive but rather the
cheapest energy among consuming nations. However, U.S. price controls
on domestic production work to reflect consumer prices lower than the
cost of the marginal supply, OPEC oil. Also, interstate natural gas is
regulated at average prices equivalent to about one-fourth the price of
world oil.
The leftward movement of the supply curve and increasing regulation
have had a serious impact on the utility industry which, in turn, has
impacted on the total energy situation. Utilities are regulated on the
basis of return on investment. Historically, this gave them incentives
to give discounts to large, new users, since marginal costs in the long
term were lower than average costs (the supply curve was moving to the
right). In other words, the next plant would be cheaper to build than
the last plant was. This encouraged new investment, which could be
leveraged, resulting in increasing return on equity, even at a regulated
return on investment.
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But now, the situation is completely different. Because marginal
costs are now higher than average costs, the next plant, and the next
increment of fuel supply will be more expensive than the last. This is
compounded by the fact that regulatory agencies are slow to grant in-
creased rates resulting from increased investment. On the other hand,
utilities can pass through the increased cost of feedstocks which drives
the utilities to obtain feedstocks at almost any price but with great
reluctance to add capacity. Reliability and continuity of supply has
become a factor at least as important as price.
THE TRUE ISSUES OF OUR ENERGY SITUATION
This description of our energy situation now makes it possible to
define and discuss those issues which need to be addressed in order to
change our current energy situation. These issues include: the value
of decreased reliance on imports; the shape of the supply and demand
curves; and energy's impact on commodity inflation, income redistribu-
tion, the quality and quantity of GNP, and unemployment.
* As shown in Figure 6, the leftward movement of the U.S.
supply curve (as well as possible rightward movement of the
demand curve) is steadily increasing our level of imported
oil. (21% of our total energy supply is now imported.) The
structure of OPEC itself is a significant factor. Although
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referred to as a cartel, it is internally heterogeneous in
that some of the countries are wealthy and can afford to
pursue long-term goals, while others are poor and are driven
by short-term needs for cash. Nevertheless, it is certainly
true that in a few months they were effective in increasing
the world price of oil by a factor of five, and have maintained
the new, higher level for several years since that rise. Such
power raises valid questions about the U.S.'s economic risks
relative to future price levels and fluctuations, continuity
of supply, and the political questions involved.
* At the same time, we do not know the shapes of the supply and
demand curves (S and D), just as we don't know the speed of
movement from S 1 to S3 and from D1 to D3. For example,
we don't know at what price S1 intersects D1 or S3 intersects
D3. One of the reasons for this is that, as can be seen in
Figure 3, since 1920, we simply have had no experience with
significant changes in energy prices. Since most alternate
energy sources cost considerably more than present world oil
prices, it is feared that an arbitrary reduction in imports
would result in a price "unacceptably high" from a social
perspective. Thus, the energy situation could be stated as:
We are uncomfortable with the uncertainty of OPEC supplies;
however, economically, they are the best bargain around, and
we can't afford to do without them.
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Crucial, in this case, is the shape of the supply curve, particu-
larly for oil and gas. If the supply curve for oil and gas is shaped
like S on Figure 7, then an increase in price from P1 to P2 would result
in a significant increase in volume from V1 to V2, with the collection
of economic rents indicated by (P2-Pi)(Vl). In other words, the economy
could possibly handle this price increase with few disruptions or
dislocations.
If, on the other hand, there just isn't much left to be found, or
if it is extremely expensive to find and produce remaining oil and gas
reserves, then the supply curve might look like S, and an increase in
price would elicit an increased volume of only V2 '- V1. In this case,
the supply/demand balance would be maintained mostly through larger
imports and/or reduced demand, despite the collection of the economic
rents. This could possibly have an adverse effect on the economy.
Related to the above are other issues which have broad and signi-
ficant implications for the economy and society as a whole. Specifically,
a significant increase in prices has important effects on commodity
inflation, and the economic rent results in considerable redistribution
of wealth. Both of these have impact on the quantity of GNP, as well as
its internal makeup, and they impact directly the unemployment level.
Also, significant shifts will inevitably result in particular hardship
cases. Stated in terms of Figure 6, a significant increase in the price
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can result in a leftward pressure on the demand curve as a result of its
effects on commodity inflation, and on the size of the GNP and its
makeup.
Because-of the rapid increases in energy prices over the past
several years, these issues are becoming a real concern in the U.S. As
prices rise, those on fixed or low incomes feel the crunch first. Also,
jobs which are eliminated because of higher fuel costs are usually jobs
held by low income wage earners. While higher energy costs affect
everyone, middle and upper Income levels are better able to absorb
higher energy costs than are low Income levels. Therefore, the gap
between the "rich" and the "poor" widens and the government is faced
with the problem of income distribution. This forces the government to
choose between allocating an Increased portion of income to current
consumption or to capital formation. The former is more socially respon-
sive in the short run, but in the long run, inhibits more efficient
consuming habits and capital formation, and therefore increased produc-
tion, thus exacerbating the problem by driving prices even higher.
These are the issues that need to be addressed and carefully thought
through prior to the implementation of any major policy options. And
policy options need to be weighed against the impact they will have on
these concerns. For example, if uncontrolled prices.will not increase
supply significantly, they may not be worth the economic disruptions and
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dislocations that may occur with higher prices. At the same time, if
higher prices increase supply substantially, we may still need policies
to accommodate the disruptions that might occur.
In addressing these issues, one must consider the following ques-
tions:
* Is the natural process of the marketplace too slow or too
uncertain to provide our energy needs at a reasonable cost
during a transition period of 30 years or so when renewable
energy sources such as fusion, breeder reactors, and solar
will become economically and technologically feasible? Or,
have we entered into an era where traditional economic struc-
tures and occurrences will no longer be adequate to meet our
needs?
* What are "proper" (i.e., mutually consistent and supportive)
roles for the public and the private sectors? In other words,
what functions should the government perform and what functions
should the private sector perform In order to create the most
practical system for handling our energy needs and related
problems?
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In order to address these two crucial questions, it is imperative
to define the model or basic suppositions on which policies are formed
and built. There are two specific viewpoints or approaches embraced
today. So much misunderstanding and real difference of opinion stem
from divergence on this issue that it is important to make a clear
statement of the approach taken by the author of this study. Without
the clear statement of the viewpoint taken by the author, the issues and
philosophies contained in this study cannot be placed in their proper
perspective.
On the one hand, much thought and analysis is focused on energy
"needs," or "''gaps" in energy supply, to be made good by the provision of
particular fuels, or by conservation. The concentration is on physical
flow. Technologies are rated according to how much can be brought
onstream, and how soon, to cover the shortfalls or gaps.
An example of this approach can be seen by references to Figures 8
and 9, taken from "ERDE-76." Figure 8 is conceived as "requirements" (=
needs) and "availabilities," without regard to or reference to prices or
costs. The task is perceived here, then, to be matching "availabilities"
with "requirements." A mismatch is then considered a "gap," e.g., to be
filled by synthetics (Figure 9), imports, etc. The concept of supply,
demand, and prices in the sense of the discussion throughout this paper
simply does not exist in gap analysis. It is important to remember,
-31-
Figure 8 
ENERGY AVAILABLE AND REQUIREMENTS IN QUADS (1015 BTU) SHOWN GRAPHICALLY BY AREA
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Figure 9'
IV
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
SCNAIUOS
0 NO NEW INITIATIVES
I IMPROVED EFFICIENCIES IN END USE
II SYNTHETICS FROM COAL AND SHALE
III INTENSIVE ELECTRIFICATION
IV LIMITED NUCLEAR POWER
V COMBINATION OF ALL TECHNOLOGIES
R IMPORTS
HANCED RECOVERY
TRIBUTED FROM
MESTIC FIELDS
2000
CALENDAR YEAR
SOURCE: ERDA-48, 1975.
Projected "Demand" for Liquids and Gases to be Met by Synthetic Fuels**
*"A National Plan for Energy Research, Development & Demonstration: Creating
Energy Choices for the Future - 1976." Volume I: "The Plan," page 55,
ERDA 76-1, Washington, D. C.
**Quotation marks added.
80
70
60
50
C,
a
a
z
z0
m
I-Cr
I-
z
3
40
30
INCL
IU ENERATE ELECTRIC PUWE R
Jl ! - Ill · il i JiV.
AA~ .... ~A
c
1-1
-33-
however, that excluding them from the analysis does not exclude real
costs from the real world. In reality, these costs are paid somehow by
the economy.
The other approach is to focus on energy prices as they operate in
a market economy. In this view, there is no such thing as an energy
"gap": Supply is always equal to demand (over any significant time
period) absent price controls and rationing. Some kinds of supply may
be less desirable because they are insecure or because they damage the
environment. But in all cases the central question is the same: What
price are we willing to pay to hold imports down or avoid environmental
losses? From this viewpoint the most important fact about a technology
is not the extent to which it may "close the gap" but its cost, for it
is cost in relation to price that will determine whether it makes any
contribution' at all.
The difference in viewpoint is fundamental and is usually a differ-
ence in perception of how the U.S. economy actually operates, of the
driving force behind changes in the energy sector, and about what policy
tools are available and going to be applied. If the circumstance is
formulated in terms of "needs" and the failure of assured supply, then
the task of government is to find new supply and utilization technol-
ogies, design and build them, and ensure (somehow) that they are used.
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This is the way energy is managed in the centrally-controlled
economies (where the "needs" approach is called the method of "energy
balances"). If the policy tools are available and the society wills to
use them, then the view is perfectly appropriate. Many services are
provided that way in this country--e.g., postal service, highways. Such
an approach was successfully and appropriately used for the planning and
subsequent provision of key commodities during World War II. For
example, the "gap" left by Japanese control of natural rubber supplies
was successfully closed by government-supported production, supplemented
by detailed regulation of the importation, pricing, and utilization of
available synthetic and natural rubber supplies.
The issue is whether the approach via "needs" and "gaps" is appro-
priate with regard to the U.S. over the next few decades. In the past,
energy provision has been left to the workings of private markets--some
regulated and some not. Energy prices and the relation of those prices
to the costs of domestic supply and conservation measures have been the
principal determinants of the magnitude and composition of the energy
sector, and of energy imports. The driving force has been profits, with
the government as one of the determinants of what was profitable. For
example, while leaving most investment and operating choices to the
private sector, public policy has had a pronounced effect on the oil
sector through various financial incentives, such as the foreign tax
credit and the depletion allowance.
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Whether this should continue is a matter of some dispute. Perhaps
the national security problem presented by oil dependence requires a
drastic change. Perhaps the prices implied by a commitment to energy
independence are socially intolerable because of the potential impact on
lifestyle and on the income distribution. If so, technological change
may relieve this squeeze by producing energy at costs lower than other-
wise available. If the new technologies did not prove competitive, then
they would need to be subsidized; and more government direction of
energy markets would serve this end.
The hypothesis adopted here is that for the foreseeable future say,
the next few decades, we are not likely to institute fundamental changes
in the structure of the energy sector, or the U.S. Government, or move
in a determined, decisive way to a more centrally-controlled energy
economy. For better or worse, the market system will predominate in the
U.S.
We are not talking here about some idealistic notion of a "free
marketplace," but rather the de facto utilization of the marketplace as
the operational decision-making mechanism. Pressures, constraints, and
incentives can be brought to bear on the marketplace, i.e., by the
government, that will influence the content of its resulting decisions,
and still utilize the functioning of the marketplace as the decision-
making process. For example, the government can have goals for unem-
ployment and inflation, but does not control or direct them; rather, it
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influences--through such tools as monetary and fiscal policy--the mar-
ketplace decisions which do in fact determine them.
If private markets will pervade in the energy sector, then "gap"
analysis (which tends to ignore prices and profits) involves analytical
and planning tools, and more importantly, policy prescriptions, that are
inconsistent with the facts of our economic organization. For example,
"commercial demonstration" of new technologies, either supply-augmenting
or demand-diminishing, can lead to economically viable new industries
only if the expected price regime which these technologies will face
provides the incentives for investments to bring them forth. When the
role of prices is ignored, the policy goals seem to be those of reducing
uncertainties regarding costs of the new technologies. The implicit
assumption is that when the new technologies are demonstrated as techni-
cally feasible and the uncertainties regarding costs and productivities
are "eliminated," commercial penetration is assured. In fact, commer-
cialization will only occur when prices are high enough to cover costs
and investment risks, or when the government subsidizes the difference.
Effective "demonstration" of new technologies can permit earlier com-
mercialization if it reduces the risks or lower subsidies or provides
more effective design.
It should also be pointed out here that we are assuming no drastic
change in the context for decision-making in the international arena
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over the next few decades. That is, on the whole, each nation will
optimize for its own benefit, within its powers to exercise sovereignty.
For example, we assume no massive movement toward a supranational "United
States of the World," where global optimization might be imposed.
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
Technology will determine, to a great extent, how much energy we
can obtain, from what energy resources, and at what cost to replace
imported oil in our market. Therefore, a discussion of technology in
the context of changing the U.S. energy situation significantly (say,
adding five to ten million barrels per day of energy) at world prices in
the next 20 to 30 years is an essential ingredient in any discussion of
our energy future.
The basic problem with a "technological" solution is that, as
outlined below, all new energy sources which might be available in
significant quantities cost appreciably more than OPEC crude, even
making reasonable assumptions for future technological progress. From
the perspective of Figure 6, one might say that OPEC has not set world
oil prices high enough for us to solve our problem technologically.
(Viewing OPEC from a commercial viewpoint, this should not be surprising.)
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From the outset, it must be understood that technology, like any
other element, has its limitations and restrictions. Many Americans
have the tendency to believe that technology, given the proper amounts
of time, money, and brain power, can accomplish any feat and cure any
ailment. Even if this were the case, we are confronted with a limited
amount of time and, to only some extent the degree of which the reader
accepts the previously defined "price" model, a limited amount of money.
Therefore, technology does have restrictions and these must be kept in
mind when considering the potential of all energy resources.
Oil and Gas
The U.S. has significant remaining oil and gas reserves. However,
given the extensive exploration and production activities conducted
domestically over the past 75 years, it is safe to say the large,
cheaply produced onshore fields have for the most part, been discovered
and tapped. The oil and gas that comprise our remaining reserves, then,
basically lie in more remote or deeper formations onshore and in frontier
regions such as the Outer Continental Shelf, deep offshore Gulf of
Mexico, the Gulf of Alaska, the Atlantic offshore and the Beaufort Sea.
Production costs in these areas will be an order of magnitude higher
than that for most of the present production, which comes primarily from
relatively accessible, conventional onshore and shallow offshore areas.
Technological progress is expected in exploration methods, but again it
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is unlikely that this will result in significant discoveries in conven-
tional areas that have been overlooked during the past century.
Technological progress in enhanced recovery will produce some
additional volumes but this will only delay the decline in production--
not permanently arrest it.
We currently rely on oil and gas for 75% of our total energy needs
(21% of our total energy needs is mported). Given this outlook for oil
and gas, it is obvious that we must begin now to consider and develop
other possible forms of energy.
Oil Shale
The cost of shale oil is expected to be between one and a half and
two times present world oil prices. The economics of this process
are limited by the inherent necessity of handling enormous quantities of
inert solids and of hydrogenation of the oil. The most likely technol-
ogical breakthrough which could make a significant supply of shale oil
economically available is in the area of in-situ processing, which could
significantly reduce either or both of these limitations.
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Coa 1
Although the U.S. has substantial coal resources, there are definite
limitations--man-made and natural--to its use. Coal utilization at
costs competitive with world oil prices is limited primarily by the need
for environmentally acceptable combustion. Stack-gas scrubbing is one
attempt to deal with this need. It is now operational, and submarginally
economical relative to world crude prices. In other words, electricity
produced in a grassroots plant started now with stack-gas scrubbing for
high-sulphur coal, is expensive relative to the world energy market.
One cannot be optimistic about the likelihood of a significant break-
through in stack-gas scrubbing technology.
The liquefaction and/or gasification of coal would permit coal to
be burned in an environmentally acceptable manner. However, the cost of
these products is expected to be two to three times present world oil
prices. Improving the economics through technological breakthroughs is
limited by the inherent need for massive hydrogenation. As in the case
of shale oil, a technological breakthrough in the area of in-situ pro-
cessing might reduce significantly or entirely this requirement, and
therefore could make an appreciable supply of liquified/gasified coal
economically available.
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Incidentally, it is worth noting that a true order-of-magnitude
breakthrough in enhanced recovery would probably lead to a similar
revolution in n-situ processing of shale oil and coal and vice versa.
They all involve a common problem, and that is one of controlling large
quantities of fluids deep within the earth without the huge expense of
mining in one form or another.
An additional possibility is the development of fluidized bed
combustion technology to the point that emissions from "dirty" fuel
would be controlled to acceptable levels within the combustion process
itself, by preventing the formation of or removing pollutants within the
fluidized combustion bed.
Nuclear Fission
Fission offered the hope of cheap energy during the 1960s. However,
since then, unit capital costs on nuclear power plants have increased
about fivefold. This outpaces the general inflation rate in the con-
struction industry. A substantial portion of this can be attributed to
regulatory delays stemming from safety and environmental concerns. This
has dramatically slowed down the building of additional nuclear facili-
ties.
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Since safety and environmental requirements change and become more
severe with almost each new plant, not only does the absolute cost of
each successive plant rise, but also "learning" takes place less effec-
tively which will result in a slower future trend of downward costs. In
addition, ultimate U.S. uranium supply at costs allowing electric gen-
eration competitive with OPEC oil is of some concern.
There seems little likelihood of economical technological break-
throughs in the foreseeable future that will deal with this situation.
Recently attention has been focussed directed at the "back end" of
the fuel cycle because of potential nuclear weapons proliferation and
radioactive waste dispoal problems. Spent fuel from reactors may be
reprocessed so that the remaining uranium and plutonium that has been
produced are separated from the radioactive wastes. The uranium and
plutonium can then be refabricated and returned to the reactor as fuel.
The economics of nuclear power are improved by reprocessing, though the
extent of improvement is highly dependent on uranium prices. The prin-
cipal issue.with regard to reprocessing is the separation of plutonium,
which can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Whether or not
the spent fuel is reprocessed, there is still an issue of how to dispose
of wastes that will be radioactive for thousands of years.
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Hydroelectric
Hydroelectric power offers insignificant additional volumes of
energy in the U.S. simply because most available damsights are already
used up.
Geothermal
Natural geothermal offers only small additional volumes of economi-
cal energy because there are only very limited sources of natural geo-
thermal steam near the surface. Forced geothermal ("hot rocks") and
subterranean hot water are expected to cost several times world crude
prices, and cannot be expected to be a significant energy source in this
century.
"Backstop" Sources
Backstop sources are energy sources and processes such as the sun,
breeder reactors, and fusion which, if perfected, offer renewable,
virtually unlimited sources of energy. The technology for these,
however, is essentially in Its infancy and many economical, technological,
and environmental hurdles must be leaped before we can see them reach
fruition. None of these can be expected to make a significant con-
tribution (e.g., five to ten million barrels/day of crude equivalent) to
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our energy supply this century. However, it is essential that work be
done on developing them now so that they will be available to us in the
future.
As with fission reactors, breeders face economic, safety, and
environmental constraints and are further complicated by the fact that
fuel reprocessing is an'integral part of the breeder'concept. The fuel
reprocessing issue is an unresolved problem. In addition, the capital
cost of a breeder plant is inherently higher than that of a fission
plant. Engineering research is needed for the process to become envi-
ronmentally viable, and It will be decades before this process becomes
economically viable.
Fusion is still in the basic research stage and offers little
prospect of technological availability this century, much less commercial
and economic availability. As with fission, the creation of some (al-
though a smaller amount) radioactive wastes Is an unresolved problem.
The use of sunlight, wind, tides, and hydrothermal seems most
appropriate during this century in Isolated, particularly, site-specific
cases. Significant use of these forms is still in the research, as
opposed to development, demonstration, or commercialization stage, and
offers little prospect of availabillty this century.
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Timber and biomass have the possibility of eventually becoming
significant energy sources, through such mechanisms as "energy planta-
tions." However, technological and infrastructure problems present
significant economic blocks, and will most likely require decades to
overcome before this possibility becomes a commercial reality.
Conservation
Consistent with the kind of analysis conducted in this paper thus
far, "conservation" is not a separate issue, but rather is the natural
result of each energy consumer taking the logical steps in view of the
price signals he receives. One of the most significant consequences of
this would be a rational utilization of the various kinds of energy,
e.g., liquid petroleum for transporation, gas for domestic and commercial,
coal for industry, and coal and uranium for utilities. A shift from
private cars and motor freight toward mass transit and rail freight
might be added to this list. This rationalization could be the natural
consequences of the decisions made through the operation of the market-
place. Educational and cultural pressures (e.g., preachments and posters)
may be somewhat helpful but have little chance of making a significant
difference when they run counter to the price signals. However, the
marketplace can, if allowed, very effectively "fit the fuel to the job."
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It is not intended here to dismiss conservation as a nonissue.
But, it is important to see where the issue lies. We argue here that
preachments of a moralistic nature ("you ought to turn off your lights")
are essentially Ineffective unless reinforced by the structure of prices.
On the other hand, a more relevant price structure would lead to a shift
in the context in which decisions are made. Before 1973, the price of
energy was a negligible factor in most decisions at the consumer level,
and even many at the commercial and industrial level, e.g., whether to
go for a drive or watch TV, how much to insulate, incandescent vs.
flourescent lighting. With relevant prices, energy would become a part
of those contexts. As an analogy, probably few menus are designed with
the cost of table salt as a factor; however, if the price of salt were
to increase significantly in a short period, it would become a part of
the context in which menus were designed, but an eduational process
would be involved, including the changing of people's eating habits.
Perhaps it is necessary to point out explicitly that we cannot
conserve our way out of the energy situation. For instance, new con-
servation technology (e.g., better insulation at lower prices) or more
complete availability and utilization of life-cycle costs can, at best,
move the demand curve of Figure 6 to the left or, more likely, slow its
movement to the right.
-47-
DIMENSIONS OF THE ENERGY ISSUES
Now that the energy situation, major issues, and the role of tech-
nology have been discussed, it is appropriate to identify and discuss
the three major dimensions of the issues at hand: the role of the
government relative to the marketplace, the Importance of the energy
situation, and the areas of policy research which are crucial to dealing
effectively with the problem.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO THE MARKETPLACE
The operation of the marketplace in an economy such as ours is
based on the premise that the sum of many individual decisions, each
made in the context of what is best for the individual, results in
patterns that are best for society as a whole. The traditional role of
the private sector is to offer these choices and make those decisions,
in that context.
Of course, there are instances where this premise does not hold.
For example, a marketplace would presumably result In some degree of
heroin traffic, but this is deemed not to be best for society as a
whole. It is, therefore, termed a "market failure," and the role of the
government is to step in and correct the failure. With regard to the
energy situation, there exist more mundane but relevant market failures
which call for government attention. These Include:
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· Failure of energy price to reflect the social value of a
barrel of oil supplied or a BTU saved (e.g., world price plus
the social value of reduced dependence on OPEC).
* Inability of a firm to appropriate as ts own private property
the results of its expenditures for research, innovation, or
technical progress.
e Regulatory or other institutional barriers where otherwise
socially desirable outlays would result.
* Inadequate structure of the market (e.g., monopoly).
a* ~Higher degree of risk aversion in the private sector than
appropriate to society at large. For example, with reference
to Figure 10, a "socially desirable" project may lie at point
"X." The market will not support it, since It lies below the
curve. The government could correct this "failure" by spending
public funds to reduce the risk from R1 to R2, at which the
market would support it. (This is a valid way of viewing
ERDA's "commercialization" program.)
a* · Inadequate information (e.g., to decide on purchase of an
automatic defrosting refrigerator on the basis of total life-
cycle costs rather than first cost).
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Figure 10
Return On
Investment
R2 Ri Risk
... . .. . . . . . .. . .. .. ...
Example of "commercialization" by reduction of risk
by the public sector.
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* Sheer size of an endeavor can result in a market failure.
The traditional role of the government is to correct such failures.
Often, the reason is unclear at the time or quickly forgotten, and the
"correction" becomes "regulation" or "intervention" in perceptions, but
we argue here that correction is the traditional role.
A second role of the government is to set the environment in which
market decisions are made. Setting this environment influences without
directing the market, through such policy tools as taxation. For instance,
the government does not direct that each family buy a home, but the
environment for this decision created by current income tax laws influ-
ence decisions toward this direction.
The third role of the government is to act as the "fireman." That
is, deal with crises, which (by definition), are short term. (It is
essential to note that the energy situation can, therefore, not be
classed as a "crisis.") This fireman role calls for instant action, but
implies that, following the fire, the fireman returns to the firehouse
to await the next crisis.
The fourth role of the government is that of the 'policeman," that
is, the corrector of injustice. For exEmple, the widow who can't afford
gasoline to drive to her job, without which she would be on welfare.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENERGY' SITUATION
Energy is something upon which everyone depends. The energy situ-
ation will, therefore, affect everyone and virtually every aspect of our
lifestyles.
Energy is a key to the development of industrial society, which is
based on improving the standard of living, and increasing discretionary
wealth and leisure time by replacing human effort with mechanical,
electrical, chemical, and other nonhuman energy. Simply put, our life-
styles and our very "system" depend on energy for their continuation and
perpetual improvement.
Because of the importance of energy, the public has taken an unpre-
cedented interest in controlling the energy market as our energy situa-
tion has deteriorated. The thesis of the marketplace is that no one is
in charge of understanding and directing it--it is self-directed by
individual choices and by trial and error. Now questions are being
raised as to the ability of the marketplace to cope adequately with the
energy situation in a manner tolerable to consumers and the public. The
government is experienced at Influencing it Indirectly, and at imposing
rules of fair play, but is not structured for predetermining answers or
distributing allocations. The difference between letting the market
decide these things by trial and error and predetermining answers and
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distributing allocations Is as stark as the difference between natural
selection and biological engineering.
Fundamental to this is that we do not have available the analytical
tools and data for predetermining answers or distributing allocations
within the required efficiency levels. Yet, there is a feeling among
many that we need to do these very things if this nation is to manage
its energy situation. Obviously, it would be foolhardy to embark upon
these objectives knowing only what we know now.
Also, the time frame over which we are talking--several decades--is
new. The problem is not only a lack of intellectual tools, but also a
lack of accountability systems in both the public and private sectors
over such a period. General problems, issues, and other elements which
are of concern' to the government and to the private sector are viewed in
time frames of only a few years. While "long-range" plans are made in
some areas, most specific planning and forecasts are made for only as'
long as five or ten years but rarely, if ever, has a time frame of 30
years or so been addressed n dealing with pertinent issues.
What We Know and Don't Know
The foregoing has provided a conceptual framework in which the
"energy situation" is defined and the basic issues are listed. Also
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derived therefrom, are a set of criteria by which to measure policy as
to consistency and effectiveness. Surely other frameworks can be devel-
oped, perhaps equally valid, which would lead to different criteria.
This should lead to a much more creative and helpful debate than the
present alternative of debating the relative merits of various isolated
policies on an adversarial basis.
Lacking such a framework, it is even conceivable that an energy
policy based only on what is possible might be counterproductive.
Dealing with short-term manifestations as if they were the problem
raises the danger of effectively treating the symptoms but unwittingly
increasing the severity of the disease. The classic picture of putting
Band-Aids on Band-Aids comes to mind. Therefore, if only to illustrate
by example, we refrain here from offering our favorite home remedy.
There is no policy which will return us to the former times of plentiful,
ever-cheaper energy, which is the premise on which our present systems
rest. The first priority--before policy delineation--is in analyzing
the new situation and the resulting issues which must be faced through-
out the next one or two generations. Only then can creative and authen-
tic policy formulation begin. We have not a problem to solve, but
rather, the challenge of whether we can learn to adapt to the new situa-
tion in which we find ourselves. The latter requires policy, but of a
different kind than the former.
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However, there remains a great deal of policy research to be done
to provide us with the information needed to formulate energy policy.
These include:
* More complete analysis of the domestic supply of primary
energy. This requires integration of geologic information,
engineering cost data, and studies of economic incentives in
order to produce better estimates of future supplies of oil,
gas, coal, and uranium.
e Studies of international markets for energy, including upgrad-
ing existing work on supply, demand, and price formation in
the world market. Current understanding of the nuclear fuel*
cycle, including its relation to nuclear weapons proliferation,
must be expanded.
* Development of improved methods for forecasting long-run
energy demand and the effects of conservation measures.
Analysis of energy demand on a 10- to 30-year horizon requires
better methods of accounting for the introduction of new
devices, and the consumer's response to them.
* Analysis of the structure and performance of the industries
that develop and commercialize new energy technologies. Study
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should focus on the processes that determine the growth of new
energy industries, such as synfuels or solar collectors, and
on federal measures intended to speed the rate of technology
development and adoption.
* Study of the relationship between energy markets and overall
economic growth and development. In order to form a basis for
long-term energy sector planning, research should seek funda-
mental advances in understanding of the role of energy in
economic growth, and its relation to capital and employment in
various sectors.
This does not suggest in any way that formulation of an energy
policy should await the needed research listed above. That is absurd as
well as impractical and contrary to the immediate needs of the nation.
The point is that we will have an unsatisfactory energy situation
for some time. Using a framework such as the one presented in this
paper we need to go ahead and formulate an energy policy which, based on
what we do know, will deal in the most constructive manner possible with
all of the issues and problems of the energy situation. As we learn
more through research and trial and error, we can adjust and improve
upon the structure within which we operate.
Such an approach as the one proposed here would start with the
situation,.develop alternate approaches which would deal significantly
with it, weigh the costs and risks against the benefits (on a macro
basis) of each, and then lastly, consider what is judicious and practical
in the world of politics and within the adversarial positions various
actors will inevitably take. This should be far more effective than the
present and opposite approach of starting to negotiate from the adver-
sarial position (or, starting with "gimmick" solutions) and not really
.testing for macro costs, risks, and benefits, or even for the real
significance vis-a-vis the situation being addressed.
Finally, we must not become complacent with whatever energy policy
is adopted this year or next. However, since it is so vital that we
make some tough policy decisions, while being faced with some significant
"unknowns," it is imperative that these decisions address the real
issues and not sub-issues or cosmetic appeals. We still have the time,
the capacity, and the flexibility to adopt an energy policy which can be
altered as we learn more. However, the longer we avoid facing the real
issues on a comprehensive basis, the less flexibility we will have with
which to face them.
